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Japan’s new mixed jury system (dubbed the saiban-in) is designed to 
democratize the criminal legal process. Many observers fear that 
professional judges will undermine this goal by using their influence to 
pressure lay persons into adopting the opinions of the court. This Article 
argues that fear of judicial domination has obscured a second set of 
objectives and that the saiban-in is also designed to maintain consistent 
and predictable decisions on verdicts and sentences and to ensure that 
those decisions reflect, but are not wholly determined by, the Supreme 
Court’s vision of justice. These objectives indicate both an enduring 
commitment to the Continental legal tradition in which modern Japanese 
law originated and the persistence of a long-standing prejudice against 
lay opinion. Reviewing meeting minutes from the Justice System Reform 
Council, the text of the Lay Assessor Act, and subsequent decisions by the 
Supreme Court on saiban-in procedure, the Article shows that officials 
intended to create a jury system that would provide ample opportunity 
for laypersons to meaningfully participate in decisions without 
sacrificing the consistency, predictability, and elite notions of justice 
maintained in Japan’s present approach to decision-making. The saiban-
in may also stem a growing wave of public punitiveness and allow justice 
officials to continue to pursue policies focused on the rehabilitation of 
offenders. This Article concludes by speculating about factors that could 
disturb the saiban-in’s delicate balance of lay and professional power. 
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 Beginning in 2009, Japan will introduce juries into criminal trials.1  
Mixed panels of lay assessors and professional judges will hear serious 
criminal cases and jointly determine guilt and sentences.  This jury 
system (dubbed the saiban-in) is designed to inject the opinions of the 
public into judicial decisions, increase public trust and understanding of 
the judiciary, and create a democratic base for the justice system.2 
 Despite a wave of enthusiasm for the jury system, a strong current of 
skepticism remains closely in tow.  Legal professionals have long 
dominated Japanese criminal justice, and prior efforts to reduce their 
 
1 Saiban-in no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru hōritsu, Law No. 63 of 2004, 
translated in Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan’s Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law:  An 
Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal 
Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 233 (2005) [hereinafter Lay Assessor Act] (setting 
forth the details of the new jury system). 
2  JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL (JSRC), RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL:  FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (June 12, 2001) [hereinafter JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS], available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html (last visited May 
10, 2009) (outlining the goals of the saiban-in system and how it should operate). 
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influence have largely failed.  The role of lay participants in Japan’s first 
jury system, which ran from 1928 to 1943, was narrowed into impotence 
by conservatives. 3   Post-war innovations intended to provide a 
democratic check on judges and prosecutors, such as prosecutorial 
review commissions 4  and a constitutional provision providing for 
electoral review of Supreme Court justices,5 have had little to no impact.  
Thus, one of the principal questions surrounding the new mixed jury 
system is whether judges will exploit their role in the panels to 
marginalize the influence of laypersons on judicial decisions. 
 This Article argues that fear of judicial domination obscures a 
second objective of the saiban-in and has led to a misreading of the 
intended role of judicial power in the mixed jury system.6  In addition to 
 
3  See Takashi Maruta, The Criminal Jury System in Imperial Japan and the 
Contemporary Argument for its Reintroduction, 72 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 215, 216 (2001) 
(explaining that the conservative members of the Privy Council removed portions of the 
original draft of the Jury Act in order to protect judges’ autonomy and supremacy in the 
courtroom).  Cf. Anna Dobrovolskaia, The Jury System in Pre-War Japan:  An Annotated 
Translation of “The Jury Guidebook” (Baishin Tebiki), 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 231, 
237-40 (2008) (discussing how the pre-war jury guidebook provides insight into the 
ultimate suspension of jury trials). 
4 See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan’s Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury 
Systems:  A Cross-6ational Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participatory 
Experience in Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 315, 323-25 (2007) (noting that 
commissions, consisting of randomly chosen Japanese citizens who examine the 
appropriateness of non-indictment decisions, have had little influence on the actions of 
prosecutors).  Fukurai argues, however, that recent reforms to the Prosecutorial Review 
Commission law may make it more effective and that the newly revised law may have a 
greater impact than the saiban-in in democratizing the criminal process.  Id. at 328. 
5  KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 79, para. 2.  See also Supreme Court of Japan, 
Overview of the Judicial System in Japan, http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
english/system/system.html (last visited May 10, 2009) (noting that no Supreme Court 
judge has ever been dismissed through electoral action). 
6 See Colin P.A. Jones, Prospects for Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in 
Japan, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 363, 365-66 (2006) (reviewing TAKASHI MARUTA, 
SAIBAN-IN SEIDO [THE LAY JUDGE SYSTEM] (2004) (arguing that the lay judge system that 
emerged from the Diet was expressly designed to minimize the impact of lay 
participation while lending legitimacy to an institution that will continue to be governed 
by professionals)).  See also JSRC 51st Meeting Minutes (Mar. 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai51/51gaiyou.html (last visited May 10, 2009) 
(summarizing discussion of an alternative saiban-in proposal, put forth by Tsuyoshi 
Takagi—supported only by himself and Kohei Nakabō—that would have provided lay 
jurors more power vis-à-vis judges by expanding the scope of cases heard by juries and 
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its democratic ambitions, the saiban-in is designed to maintain consistent 
and predictable decisions on verdicts and sentences and to ensure that 
those decisions reflect, but are not wholly determined by, the Supreme 
Court’s vision of justice.  Judges are expected to serve as legal 
specialists, teaching lay jurors complex legal concepts and explaining the 
rationale behind the judiciary’s decision-making process, while still 
leaving that process open to contest and modification by lay jurors.  
These jurors in turn are expected to contribute common sense and 
diverse perspectives.  A robust set of safeguards has been put in place, 
both in the text of the Lay Assessor Act and through guidelines on 
judicial behavior enforced by the Supreme Court, to allow lay jurors to 
meaningfully shape decisions in ways unavailable to their counterparts in 
mixed juries in Western Europe and even to American jurors. 
 Through this division of labor, I argue, the saiban-in seeks to glean 
some of the benefits of lay participation—strengthened public trust in the 
judiciary and a decision-making process more attuned to the 
complexities of life—without resigning the justice system to the 
presumed inconsistency or bias of lay opinion, or abandoning notions of 
desert and punishment held by an educated elite.  Judicial power in the 
saiban-in may also stem a growing wave of public punitiveness and 
allow justice officials to continue to pursue policies focused on the 
rehabilitation of offenders. 
 The intended role of professional judges in the saiban-in reflects an 
enduring commitment to the Continental tradition in which modern 
Japanese law was birthed.  This tradition strives for consistency and 
seeks to apply the adjudicatory standards of high authority throughout 
 
creating all-lay panels for hearing political crimes and crimes by public officials).  Even 
those who are optimistic about the democratic potential of the saiban-in remain cautious.  
Scholars have been meticulously scanning the Lay Assessor Act and subsequent 
decisions on jury procedure, identifying potential avenues for influence by the elite and 
offering proposals to boost opportunities for meaningful lay participation.  See generally 
Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System:  A Few 
Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (saiban-in seido) from 
Domestic Historical and International Psychological Perspectives, 37 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 935, 946 (2004) (reviewing different proposals for the Lay Assessor Act 
while exposing competing interests in the drafting process); Matthew Wilson, The Dawn 
of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan:  Success on the Horizon?, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 835, 839 
(2007) (examining different perspectives concerning the lay jury system and proposing 
suggestions for surmounting the new challenges posed by the system). 
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the justice system by entrusting the discovery of truth to trained 
professionals, obligating those professionals to provide reasons for their 
decisions, and ensuring the propriety of decisions through superior 
review.  The saiban-in signals both a democratic advance and an 
affirmation of Japan’s Continental tradition. 
 The Article is organized as follows:  Part II reviews the historical 
development of the Japanese criminal justice system.  It emphasizes a 
tension between the pre-WWII Continental legal tradition and post-war 
American reforms, and proposes that Japanese justice officials have 
resisted lay participation in the judiciary because they seek to administer 
the justice system according to the Continental tradition.  Part III uses 
Mirjan Damaška’s model of the hierarchical and coordinate ideals to 
illuminate the nature of this tradition and explain the operation of the 
Japanese criminal justice system. 
 Part IV explores the intended purposes of the saiban-in by analyzing 
the meeting minutes of the Justice System Reform Council (JSRC), the 
thirteen-member body responsible for proposing the new jury system.  
The minutes reflect that the system is a product of compromise between 
one group, which sought to create a more responsive judiciary by 
transferring judicial power from career judges to lay persons, and the 
Supreme Court and procuracy, which sought to uphold the consistency 
and presumed fairness of decisions achieved through fidelity to uniform 
standards.  Part V explains how long-standing prejudice against lay 
opinion, held by both groups, strengthened the ability of judges to 
present the Court’s vision of justice. 
 Part VI analyzes the Lay Assessor Act and subsequent decisions by 
the Supreme Court on saiban-in procedures to demonstrate that the new 
jury system provides ample opportunity for laypersons to meaningfully 
participate in decisions without sacrificing the consistency, 
predictability, and elite notions of justice maintained in Japan’s present 
approach to decision-making.  In the Conclusion, I speculate about 
factors that could disturb the saiban-in’s delicate balance of lay and 
professional power. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A. Pre-WWII Inquisitorial Justice 
 
 Prior to the occupation, Japanese justice had been highly inquisitorial 
for over a century.  Under the Tokugawa regime, responsibility for fact-
finding lay with shogunate investigators who conducted detailed 
examinations of evidence 7  and intense questioning of suspects and 
witnesses in order to “state the truth” in their written record of the facts.8  
This, together with the suspect’s written confession, formed the 
centerpiece of the trial, which amounted to little more than a perfunctory 
confirmation of the written record.9 
 The 1880 Code of Criminal Instruction, which established the French 
inquisitorial system in Japan, introduced a more elaborate system of rules 
and procedures and, together with the 1889 Constitution, provided some 
minimal protections for the defendant, such as the right for counsel to 
participate in proceedings.10  Nevertheless, these protections were never 
allowed to obstruct an official inquiry into the truth.11  Under the Code, 
the examining judge was empowered to interrogate suspects, collect 
evidence for revealing facts concerning the case, and determine whether 
to send the case to trial.12  In reality, procurators played a dominant role 
at this stage and possessed broad powers to arrest, detain, and interrogate 
suspects.13  Defense lawyers were subordinate to procurators, who at trial 
stood on a raised platform alongside judges as representatives of the 
 
7  See Yoshirō Hiramatsu, Summary of Tokugawa Criminal Justice, 22 LAW IN 
JAPAN:  AN ANNUAL 105, 118 (Daniel H. Foote trans., 1989). 
8 Id. at 116. 
9 Id. at 117. 
10 See Petra Schmidt, Law of Criminal Procedure, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN 
SINCE 1868, at 681, 693 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005) (citing article 266 of the 1880 Code of 
Criminal Instruction).  See also id. at 688−94. 
11 See Kuk Cho, The Japanese “Prosecutorial Justice” and its Limited Exclusionary 
Rule, 12 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 39, 46-47 (1998) (arguing that in the pre-war legal regime, 
restrictions on rights were deemed constitutional as long as those restrictions had a 
statutory basis).  For example, the constitutional prohibition against investigators entering 
a person’s home without consent could be relaxed by legislation.  Id. at 46 n.39. 
12 Schmidt, supra note 10, at 692. 
13 KEISOHŌ [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Law No. 75 of 1922, arts. 123, 255, 
cited in Cho, supra note 11, at 45. 
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state.14  Although the system operated formally under the principle of the 
presumption of innocence, the decision by the examining judge to send 
the case to trial was widely considered sufficient evidence of guilt.15  
Subsequent changes to the criminal code saw the rising influence of 
German law, culminating in the Criminal Code of 1907.16  In sum, during 
this period, Japanese criminal justice was inquisitorial, with a special role 
for procurators in uncovering the truth.17 
 
B. Post-War Occupation Reforms 
 
 Following World War II, occupation authorities sought to de-
inquisitorialize the justice system and reform it in the image of American 
law.  First, they reorganized the justice system to secure the 
independence of the judiciary from political and investigatory bodies.18  
The newly formed Supreme Court (previously subordinate to the 
Ministry of Justice) was handed administrative control over the judiciary, 
which remained a unitary system.19  The preliminary investigation stage 
was eliminated and the role of the examining judge abolished.20  Trial 
judges were stripped of their investigatory powers and given the role of 
impartial referees.21  Free evaluation of evidence was limited by rules 
 
14 Schmidt, supra note 10, at 693. 
15 Id. 
16  Wilhelm Röhl, Generalities, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, at 26 
(Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005). 
17 See Shigemitsu Dandō, System of Discretionary Prosecution in Japan, 18 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 518, 518-21 (1970) (discussing the development of discretionary prosecution in 
the pre-war era). 
18 See John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary:  Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, 
and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN:  A TURNING POINT 99, 118−20 (Daniel H. Foote 
ed., 2007) (portraying judicial independence as a central concern of post-war judicial 
reforms). 
19 See id. at 117−18 (discussing the debate over whether this action was necessary to 
promote accountability).  
20 MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 125 (2d ed., 2002). 
21 See KEISOHŌ, Law No. 131 of 1948, art. 297 (maintaining one vestige of trial 
judges’ former power by empowering them to “determine the scope, order, and method 
of examination of evidence”), translated as amended at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/ 
hourei/data/COCP_1-2.pdf (last visited May 10, 2009). 
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excluding hearsay. 22   The right to cross-examine was handed to the 
prosecution and the newly strengthened defense.23 
 Among the most important reforms was the multitude of procedural 
protections guaranteed by the new Constitution.  These included the 
privilege against self-incrimination,24  the right to a public trial,25  and 
access to a competent attorney paid by state funds if necessary. 26 
Investigators now had to obtain a warrant for searches27 and arrests,28 and 
suspects had to be informed of the charges against them immediately 
following their apprehension.29  Confessions made under compulsion or 
prolonged arrest could no longer be admitted as evidence and no one 
could be convicted on the basis of their confession alone.30 
 Despite their efforts, occupational authorities did not transform 
Japanese criminal justice into an adversarial system.  The Code of 
Criminal Procedure was a product of compromise between the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Japanese officials, and the 
document retained many of its inquisitorial features.31  John O. Haley 
observes that while the procedural protections included in the post-war 
Constitution and revised Code of Criminal Procedure reflect the 
influence of American law, the reliance on detailed legal codes and an 
inquisitorial approach to justice reflect the country’s Continental 
heritage.  An important exception is the discretion enjoyed by police and 
prosecutors in disposing cases, which differs sharply from Continental 
practice.32 
 
22 Id. art. 320, para. 1. 
23 KENPŌ, art. 37.  See also ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN:  
A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK 142 (1976) (considering the extent of changes under the 
revised Code of Criminal Procedure). 
24 KENPŌ, art. 38. 
25 Id. art. 37. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. art. 35. 
28 Id. art. 33. 
29 Id. art. 34. 
30 See id. art. 38.  Despite the inclusion of these protections in the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court interprets them in a way that renders them ineffective in practice.  See 
infra notes 103-110 and accompanying text. 
31 See generally KEISOHŌ. 
32 See JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER 126 (1994) (citing figures 
to illustrate the discretion enjoyed by police and prosecutors). 
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C. Two Perspectives on Japanese Criminal Justice and Support for 
Lay Participation 
 
 The competing influence of inquisitorial and adversarial legal ideas 
has given rise to a passionate debate among Japanese legal observers on 
the nature of contemporary Japanese criminal justice.  The debate centers 
around two theories.33   The first, championed by Shigemitsu Dandō, 
holds that the essential inquisitorial nature of the justice system did not 
change under the occupation and that the prosecutor remains a neutral 
representative of the state.34  Dandō’s rival, Ryūichi Hirano, sees the 
occupation reforms as transformative and seeks to move the operation of 
the justice system in line with American adversarial justice.35  Judges and 
prosecutors tend to subscribe to the inquisitorial view, which expects 
legal professionals to discover the truth.  Generally, defense lawyers and 
activists support the adversarial perspective, which calls for greater 
restrictions on the activities of investigating officials. 
 This division causes much friction between defense attorneys and 
justice officials (particularly over the right to silence) and it also explains 
the Supreme Court’s intense opposition to lay participation.36  During the 
JSRC debates,37 the Court resisted almost every argument jury advocates 
presented.  Where jury supporters saw juries as the fulfillment of the 
Japanese Constitution’s democratic ambitions, the Court saw a violation 
of the document’s prescribed role for the judiciary.  Where supporters 
 
33 See generally Cho, supra note 11, at 48-50 (providing a more extensive discussion 
of these theories). 
34 See SHIGEMITSU DANDŌ, JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 82-83 (B.J. George, Jr. 
trans., 1965) (“[O]ne may well say that criminal procedure comprises the adversary party 
system in form and the concept of officially-controlled proceedings in substance.”). 
35  RYŪICHI HIRANO, KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ GAISETSU [OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
LAW] 11-14 (1968). 
36 Not all defense attorneys support the new jury system. Shunkichi Takayama, an 
attorney who has unsuccessfully run for the presidency of the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations (JFBA) five times, opposes the saiban-in.  He argues that the Japanese 
public is not ready for such a drastic reform. Takayama likens the jury summons to 
general conscription during WWII and suspects that jury reform is part of an effort to 
militarize Japanese society.  See generally SHUNKICHI TAKAYAMA, SAIBAN-IN SEIDO WA 
IRANAI [WE DO NOT NEED THE SAIBAN-IN SYSTEM] (2006). 
37 The Justice System Reform Council held sixty-three meetings from 1999 to 2001. 
Meeting minutes are available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/index.html 
[hereinafter JSRC Meeting Minutes] (last visited May 10, 2009). 
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perceived an international trend toward jury trials, the Court saw an 
international retreat.  Where they charged that the increasing complexity 
of cases required more diverse adjudicators, the Court championed the 
importance of professional expertise.  And where jury advocates viewed 
lay Japanese as superior fact-finders, judges saw only illogical reasoning 
and unpredictable decisions.38  So opposed was the Court to popular 
participation in the judiciary that even after the decision to introduce 
juries had become a fait accompli, the Court lobbied the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party to prevent an all-lay jury from being approved.39  This 
was an extraordinary move in light of the judiciary’s long-standing 
tendency to avoid overt displays of political participation.40 
 Part of the Court’s opposition undoubtedly rested in naked 
occupational interest.  In the context of seeking to improve the justice 
system, any transfer of power from judges to lay persons implied some 
fault on the part of the professional judiciary and threatened to diminish 
the prestige of its officials.  But members of the judiciary and procuracy 
have also opposed juries because their approach to justice depends on 
professionally trained adjudicators and consistent and predictable 
decision-making.  To understand why justice officials viewed lay 
participation as a danger to be contained, one must first understand the 
nature and assumptions of Continental justice and how it has been 
institutionalized in Japan. 
 
III. CONTINENTAL JUSTICE IN JAPAN 
 
 The first sub-section introduces Mirjan Damaška’s model on the 
hierarchical and coordinate ideals (abstracted from the European 
Continental and Anglo-American justice systems, respectively).  It 
provides a theoretical understanding of Continental justice and illustrates 
 
38 See Jones, supra note 6, at 366-67 (discussing the Court’s opposition to an all-lay 
jury). 
39 Id. at 367.  But cf. JSRC 30th Meeting Minutes (Sept. 12, 2000), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai30/30gaiyou.html (last visited May 10, 2009) 
(putting forth the Supreme Court’s proposal to have two laypeople and three judges 
decide criminal cases, but the laypeople would provide only opinions and not votes). 
40  Haley, supra note 18, at 116 (discussing judges’ tendency to refrain from 
engaging in political activity). 
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why its principles differ from the assumptions behind lay participation.41  
Next, I explain the core features of the Japanese criminal justice system 
by showing how it conforms to Damaška’s hierarchical ideal. 
 
A. Mirjan Damaška’s Hierarchical and Coordinate Ideals 
 
 According to the hierarchical ideal, justice is entrusted to 
permanently placed legal professionals organized in a hierarchy.42  Those 
at the top are responsible for articulating the law and its legal terms and 
conventions in order to advance the organization’s vision of justice.  
Terms like “reckless driving” and “self-defense” acquire such precise 
definitions that someone unschooled in the language of the court would 
be unable to fully capture.  In the hierarchical ideal, high ranking officers 
hold long terms in office, thus creating conditions where legal analysis 
becomes routinized. 43   Issues that come before the professional 
adjudicator are not regarded as unique.44  Cases are typified45 and in the 
process some factors consistently influence decisions, while others fade 
from view with equal regularity.  Officials take a “legalistic” approach to 
decision-making in which they are expected to render a particular 
judgment whenever facts are found that are specified under a normative 
standard.46  The propriety of decisions is then judged by their fidelity to 
this standard.47 
 The operation and organization of the justice system is structured to 
ensure that the standards set by those of the highest authority are applied 
consistently at all levels of the hierarchy.48  Because decision making in 
the hierarchical ideal requires not only knowledge of the written law, but 
also mastery of its officially sanctioned interpretations, adjudication lies 
with professionals trained in the ways and conventions of the 
organization.  The influence of outsiders who do not necessarily share 
the organization’s vision of justice is limited or, when possible, 
 
41 See generally Mirjan Damaška, The Faces of Justice and Authority 16-46 (1991). 
42 Id. at 18-19. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 19. 
45 Id. at 20. 
46 Id. at 21. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 19−21. 
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excluded. 49   Superior review of lower-level decisions is routine and 
comprehensive.50  Additionally, the power of those in authority is further 
emphasized by the probability that lower-level decision-makers who 
stray from the convention are unlikely to receive promotions.51 
 In the hierarchical ideal, democratic accountability lies at the top.  
Elected leaders signal the values and ambitions of the general public to 
appointed officials who then construct and enforce standards for the 
operation of justice that they believe will advance the public’s desires. 
In the coordinate ideal, which Damaška extrapolates from the Anglo-
American adversarial system, justice rests with lay persons.52  Decisions 
need not adhere to any technical standard and can follow from 
“prevailing ethical, political, or religious norms,” or common sense.53  
Contrary to the hierarchical ideal, lay adjudicators, typically holding a 
single term in office or residing in their positions for a limited period, 
regard issues in their cases as unique.54  No official guidelines indicate 
which factors should receive probative weight or when a critical 
threshold of evidence has been reached.  The definition of terms such as 
“reckless driving” and “self-defense” fluctuate from community to 
community and person to person, and no external standard exists to 
determine which is right.  Interpretative differences among a set of 
adjudicators are resolved internally through the deliberative process.  
Because decision-making need not conform precisely to any pre-
determined process, superior review is limited.55 
 In the coordinate ideal, accountability lies at the bottom.  Lay 
persons are presumed to embody the public’s will and inject the values of 
their communities into the deliberative process.  Under the hierarchical 
model, definitions of legal terms and notions of justice are adjudicated 
solely at the top.  By contrast, in the coordinate ideal, this type of 
deliberation occurs anew for each case, allowing for more individualized 
justice.  This also creates an environment more tolerant of diverse values 
and visions of justice, including those of minority sub-cultures.  Because 
 
49 Id. at 19. 
50 Id. at 20. 
51 Id. at 21. 
52 Id. at 24. 
53 Id. at 27. 
54 Id. at 24. 
55 Id. at 26. 
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each case is regarded as unique and each set of lay persons brings 
different values to bear on the issues, predictable decisions are not 
expected. 
 Robert Kagan observes that the hierarchical and coordinate ideals 
adopt different defenses against different injustices.56  The coordinate 
ideal fears that government authorities will use the criminal code as a 
means of repression or create laws that are excessively rigid and 
unresponsive to minority opinion. 57   Politically independent defense 
lawyers serve as a check against these tendencies by disputing evidence 
and questioning the fairness of laws.58  Decision making is entrusted to 
lay persons who are neither rewarded nor disciplined for their judgments.  
Accountability is enforced by those external to the system. 
 In contrast, the hierarchical ideal fears the “corrupt local police chief, 
the ideological judge who disregards national policies he dislikes, and 
the jury that acquits or convicts because of the defendant’s race.”59  By 
enforcing a uniform standard, the hierarchical ideal attempts to 
“minimize the inconsistency, bias, and injustice that can stem from local, 
parochial influences on criminal justice system officials.”60 
 The hierarchical official will seek to exclude outsiders from the 
adjudicatory process because the system in which he was reared defines 
justice as fidelity to conventions and explicit standards.  Persons ignorant 
of these standards, and possibly unsympathetic to the goals they advance, 
will adopt their own criteria in their evaluations.  This will lead to 
decisions that are inconsistent and, to the eyes of the hierarchical judge, 
incorrect.  Disparate responses to similar cases will appear to the 
coordinate official as a proper individualization of cases executed by 
adjudicators familiar with the complexities of life.  To the hierarchical 
official, this difference represents a failure to categorize cases with 
similar circumstances, caused perhaps by an ignorance of standards, or 
irrationality, excessive emotional investment, or bias.  Japanese justice 
 
56  ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSIAL LEGALISM:  THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 71 
(2003). 
57  See id. (emphasizing the need for “fragmentation of power and grassroots 
democratic responsiveness”). 
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
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officials opposed juries because the justice system over which they 
preside closely conforms to the hierarchical ideal. 
 
B. The Post-War Japanese Judiciary 
 
 The Japanese judiciary is a unitary national system.  Small claims 
and minor criminal offenses are overseen by summary courts, which are 
typically staffed by retired judges and prosecutors or former court 
administrative officials.  District and high court positions are the 
exclusive province of an individual who has spent his career within the 
judicial system.61  District courts serve as the courts of first instance.62  In 
all but very minor cases, district court judges sit in panels of three.63  
They are responsible for deciding all matters of fact and law.64  Criminal 
judgments can be appealed to one of the eight high courts. 65   The 
Supreme Court, which functions as a constitutional court and court of 
last resort, sits atop this hierarchy.66  By law, Supreme Court justices are 
appointed by the cabinet.67  In practice, however, the judiciary selects 
who will fill a vacancy on the Court and the cabinet rubber-stamps the 
decision.68 
 In keeping with its civil law origins, legislation is the primary source 
of law.  There is only one jurisdiction and criminal procedure is uniform 
throughout Japan.  Criminal law is compiled in two documents, the Code 
of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code, which are the primary 
 
61 Haley, supra note 18, at 103.  
62 Id. at 100. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 100-01. 
65 Id. at 101. 
66 Id. at 102. 
67 Id. at 106 (citing Saibansho hō [Court Organization Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 
41). 
68 There is significant disagreement over the meaning of this process.  Compare id. 
at 106-07 (stating that the practice is a sign of the extraordinary autonomy of the 
judiciary and its independence from the political branches), with J. MARK RAMSEYER & 
ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
JUDGING IN JAPAN 9 (2003) (arguing that the cabinet has no need to interfere in 
appointments because the judiciary only nominates candidates who will be acceptable to 
the ruling party).  
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references for criminal adjudication.69  Case law is of only secondary 
importance.  The Supreme Court determines how various codes and 
statutes should be interpreted and establishes conventions for 
adjudicating cases.  
 In addition to exercising judicial power, the Supreme Court is the 
highest authority on judicial administration.  This authority is exercised 
through the Court’s General Secretariat, the most powerful organ of the 
judiciary.  Even among bureaucratic civil law systems, the Japanese 
judiciary is distinguished by the General Secretariat’s persistent 
regulation and manipulation of judicial careers.70   Staffed by over a 
hundred career judges, the Secretariat uses its power to ensure that all 
aspects of the judiciary, such as fact-finding, application of the law, and 
sentencing, conform to the standards established by the Supreme Court.71 
 The first instrument in the Supreme Court’s arsenal to achieve this 
conformity is education.  Candidates for the three branches of the legal 
profession—the private bar, the procuracy, and the judiciary—are 
determined by a national exam, and all receive uniform and mandatory 
training at the Supreme Court’s Legal Training and Research Institute 
(LTRI). 72   Until recently, the LTRI was the sole post-graduate 
professional school for law in Japan.73  While future prosecutors and 
attorneys are further educated in legal norms and practices by the 
professional organizations that they join after graduation (the procuracy 
and private bar, respectively), all future members of the legal profession 
are inculcated in a common vision of justice determined by the Supreme 
Court. 
 
69  See generally HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 35 (2d ed., 2001) (providing an 
overview of the Japanese legal system). 
70 See Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants?  Two Views 
of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 421, 453 (2005). 
71 See generally Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, 25 
KOBE U. L. REV. 45, 46-48 (1991) (summarizing how the Japanese Supreme Court 
oversees the judiciary).  See also Upham, supra note 70, at 439-40 (debating whether the 
General Secretariat also uses its authority to punish judges who are sympathetic to causes 
that go against the interests of the ruling party). 
72 Haley, supra note 18, at 99. 
73 See Kahei Rokumoto, Legal Education, in LAW IN JAPAN:  A TURNING POINT 190, 
219−22 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) (explaining the general principles and organization 
of the new law school system).   
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 The Court also possesses exclusive control over the appointment, 
reappointment, rotation, and promotion of career judges through the 
personnel office of the General Secretariat.74  This authority is primarily 
used to create incentives for hard work and to reward achievement.  
Judges whose work is favored by the Secretariat receive prestigious 
appointments in Tokyo and within the Secretariat itself.  This inevitably 
produces a strong incentive for judges to conform their opinions to the 
legal interpretations of the Supreme Court. 
 Elite judges connected to the Court, including experienced judges 
who work as Supreme Court clerks and judges that work in the General 
Secretariat, also use judicial conferences to present the Court’s legal 
interpretations in complex or politically sensitive cases to lower court 
judges.  Once a forum for free discussion among judges, by 1970 the 
conferences came under the control of the General Secretariat.75  Lower 
courts send a judge who is handling a case that involves a specific issue 
being discussed at a conference.76  Judges from the bureau of the General 
Secretariat responsible for that issue present their opinions on how the 
issue should be handled.77  The attending judge then returns to her court 
and conveys the opinion to her colleagues.78  Uniformity in decision-
making is further enforced by a special rotation system.  Judicial careers 
do not follow a linear path.  A prestigious posting in the Supreme Court’s 
Secretariat may be followed by a series of assignments in district 
courts.79  This practice “ensures the continuous and pervasive influence 
of senior judges as monitors and mentors throughout the judicial 
system.” 80   Monitoring of judicial decisions is made easy by the 
comparatively tiny number of career judges.  Today, roughly two 
thousand career and assistant judges work in district, family, and high 
courts, as well as the Supreme Court’s General Secretariat.81  Despite 
Japan’s economic growth in the post-war period, from 1950 to 1989 the 
 
74 Haley, supra note 18, at 99. 





79 Haley, supra note 18, at 104. 
80 Id. at 105. 
81 Id. at 101. 
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per capita number of judges decreased. 82   Since the Court can 
unilaterally determine the number of people who enter the legal 
profession and become judges, this may represent an attempt to ensure a 
tightly knit judiciary that is easy to supervise and regulate.83  Consistency 
and uniformity are also maintained through a robust system of superior 
review.  Judges must provide a full written statement of their findings 
and application of the law.  Because the judiciary is primarily concerned 
with enforcing established standards and ensuring consistency 
throughout the judicial system, these statements are necessary for 
superiors to determine whether or not rulings in lower courts correctly 
adhered to precedent.  This belief that justice rests on fidelity to Court 
standards is also why both convictions and acquittals can be appealed in 
criminal trials.  This is consistent with the Continental understanding of 
double jeopardy, in which a case is not considered finalized until all 
appeals have been exhausted.84 
 In sum, the Japanese judiciary provides career judges with little 
incentive, let alone opportunity, to act on individual initiative and 
remains a conformist institution tightly regulated by the General 
Secretariat.  Given its vertical ordering, the judiciary exemplifies the 
hierarchical ideal with its strict enforcement of consistency in decision-
making and trust in professional adjudicators.  Judges, however, have 
only a partial influence on the outcome of cases. 
 More than any other actor in the Japanese justice system, prosecutors 
determine the fates of reported suspects.  Japanese prosecutors exercise a 
near perfect monopoly on prosecutorial power. 85   They can reduce 
 
82 Shigeo Kisa, Saibankan no senmonsei to dokuritsusei (ichi): nishi doitsu no jimu 
to hikaku shite [Professionalism and Independence of Judges (1):  A Comparison with 
Practice in West Germany], 40 HOKUDAI HŌGAKU RONSHŪ  1443, 1456 (1990), cited in 
Miyazawa, supra note 71, at 59. 
83 Id. at 59. 
84  Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 4, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. No. 117, as amended by 
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby, May 11, 1994, Europ. 
T.S. No. 155. 
85 See DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE:  PROSECUTING CRIME IN 
JAPAN 222-24 (2001) (describing the ineffectiveness of various external controls on 
prosecutors).  Several mechanisms outside the procuracy exist to control prosecutorial 
activity, but they have little impact.  The impotence of the prosecutorial review 
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charges and divert cases to summary courts for more lenient sentences or 
suspend prosecution entirely.  For instance, in 2005, of the 367,025 non-
traffic penal code offenses the procuracy received, 36.4% were 
transferred to Family Court, 5.9% were sent for summary trial procedure, 
21.0% received suspensions of prosecution, 12.8% were closed for other 
reasons including insufficient evidence and 23.9% reached district 
court.86 
 Prosecutors capitalize on the judiciary’s consistency to shape 
decisions that are formally under the exclusive purview of the courts.  
Fully aware of the evidence required by the judiciary to convict, 
prosecutors indict only those cases likely to end in conviction, yielding 
the country’s 99% conviction rate.87   Prosecutors also can determine 
sentencing.  By tracking sentencing decisions though computer software, 
prosecutors know how to adjust their sentencing requests to produce the 
desired result.88  In sum, prosecutors do not merely prosecute cases; they 
determine outcomes.  It is for this reason Japanese justice is often called 
“prosecutorial justice.”  In seeking to determine how suspects are treated, 
Japanese prosecutors find themselves in a quasi-judicial role.  And, like 
the Japanese judiciary, the Japanese procuracy exemplifies Damaška’s 
hierarchical ideal. 
 
C. The Japanese Procuracy 
 
 As with the judiciary, the Japanese procuracy is a single, national, 
centralized, and hierarchical career bureaucracy.  Prosecutors form an 
elite corps of uniformly trained professionals, organized under the 
Ministry of Justice.  Prosecutors do not perceive their role as partisan 
actors in the adversarial tradition.  Rather, they see themselves as 
 
committees has already been mentioned.  See Fukurai, supra note 4.  The “analogical 
institution of the prosecution” (fushinpan seikyū) allows complainants in a narrow range 
of cases to ask judges to indict suspects when prosecutors refuse.  Id. at 223.  Complaints 
of this kind are rare.  Likewise, civil suits do little to discourage prosecutors from 
indicting.  Id. at 223−24. 
86  See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2006:  NEW TRENDS OF 
CRIMINAL POLICY app. 2-2, available at http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/55/nfm/mokuji.html 
(last visited May 10, 2009). 
87 See JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 216-18 (disputing this number, though still finding 
a relatively high conviction rate). 
88 Id. at 66. 
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impartial officials dedicated to discovering the truth. 89   Veteran 
prosecutors inculcate their subordinates in this mission through lectures, 
training sessions, and informal discussions.90 
 The procuracy dominates the pre-trial phrase of the criminal process.  
Prosecutors direct the police to find new evidence, interview witnesses 
and interrogate suspects, summarize statements in words of their 
choosing, and compile all evidence, incriminating as well as exculpatory, 
in a dossier.91  Prosecutorial decisions on how to a dispose of a suspect 
are based on this document, which, in the case of an indictment, is 
submitted to the court and often forms the only proof offered at trial.92 
 As in the judiciary, decision-making follows precise standards set 
and enforced by superiors.  Individual prosecutors lack the independence 
of their American counterparts.  Prosecutors are held together by the 
principle of prosecutorial unity in which superiors command and 
subordinates obey.93   Specific criteria for charging and sentencing 
decisions are communicated through written manuals and guidelines.94 
Charging decisions and sentencing requests are determined collectively.95  
Subordinates must secure the approval of two or three superiors before 
making a decision.96  An acquittal, being rare, is understood as a disgrace 
resulting from a departure from proper procedure.  Prosecutors 
responsible for such “errors” are required to carefully document their 
mistakes97 and will be subject to unfavorable job assignments.98 
 Because prosecutors view themselves as impartial officials and rely 
on internal mechanisms for discipline and accountability, the role of the 
defense lawyer is largely eclipsed.  Indeed, to the Japanese prosecutor, 
defense activities inhibit the procuracy’s pursuit of the truth.  For much 
of the post-war era, prosecutors tightly regulated the actions of defense 
 
89 Id. at 98. 
90 Id. at 126-127. 
91 Id. at 51. 
92 See Takeo Ishimatsu, Are Criminal Defendants in Japan Truly Receiving Trials by 
Judges?, 22 LAW IN JAPAN 143, 145-50 (Daniel H. Foote trans., 1989) (describing the 
content and importance of dossiers). 
93 JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 121. 
94 Id. at 128. 
95 Id. at 128-32. 
96 Id. at 130. 
97 Id. at 228-29. 
98 Id. at 226. 
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lawyers at the pre-trial stage.  Prosecutors determined the time and 
duration of meetings between lawyers and detained suspects.99  The post-
war Code of Criminal Procedure also did not require prosecutors to turn 
over all documents and evidence to the defense.100  The prosecutor only 
had to disclose the evidence he submitted to the court.  These 
restrictions, coupled with the prosecutorial habit of indicting only those 
cases likely to end in conviction, fostered a model of defense work that, 
in the pre-trial phase, centered on persuading the prosecutor to suspend 
prosecution or send the case to summary court and, in the trial period, on 
securing leniency, not an acquittal.101 
 Constitutionally prescribed obstacles to evidence collection also do 
not hinder prosecutorial activities at either the pre-indictment or trial 
stages.  Evidentiary barriers evolved within the adversarial system and 
serve two functions:  to exclude evidence “on the theory that its impact 
on the trier of facts may be stronger than its actual probative weight”102 
and to check the corruption of overzealous government authority. 103  
Civil law jurists, however, tend to reject both rationales.  Professional 
triers of facts are presumed capable of properly weighing all evidence, 
and their duty to uncover the truth overrides extraneous considerations.104   
 In the same fashion, the Japanese procuracy and judiciary share a 
trust both in the ability of highly trained professionals to uncover the 
truth and in the efficacy of organizational mechanisms to ensure 
accountability and discipline.  As a result, Japanese judges exercise their 
warrant-granting authority and interpret the Constitution in ways that 
 
99 Id. at 36. 
100 Id. 
101 Masayuki Murayama, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the Japanese Criminal 
Process, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT:  CONTROVERSIES AND 
COMPARISONS 42, 49-52 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002) 
(summarizing that the main goal of pretrial defense work is to make the prosecutor 
dismiss the charge or to get a summary conviction and arguing that both retained counsel 
and court-appointed counsel’s work focuses on mitigating circumstances to obtain lenient 
sentences rather than challenging the charge and arguing for a different legal construction 
of the alleged facts). 
102  Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of 
Criminal Procedure:  A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 514 (1972).  
103  See, e.g., id. at 521-22 (discussing how some evidence will be rejected if 
testimony has been obtained from defendants illegally). 
104 Id. at 514. 
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render procedural protections moot.  The methods and legal justifications 
that allow investigators to override these protections are by now well 
documented.105 
 A brief discussion of how the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination is treated will be sufficient to illustrate the inquisitorial 
nature of the system.  In total, suspects in Japan can be detained without 
indictment for up to 23 days. 106   Seventy-two hours after an arrest, 
prosecutors must either release the suspect or apply to a judge for a ten-
day detention warrant, renewable once.107  These requests are routinely 
granted.108  The right against self-incrimination109 is interpreted in a way 
that obligates suspects to endure interrogation during their detention.110  
In 1993, the Supreme Court denied a man’s claim that investigators had 
violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination by detaining 
him incommunicado for days, denying him access to a lawyer, and 
ignoring his refusals to speak.111  The Court responded that while he had 
no duty to respond to questions, attendance at interrogation sessions was 
 
105  See Cho, supra note 11, at 50-72 (discussing restrictions on constitutional 
requests in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Policy Duty Law and the Japanese 
Supreme Court’s limited exclusionary rules); Daniel H. Foote, Confessions and the Right 
to Silence in Japan, 21 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415 (1991) (arguing that, for historical 
reasons, the Japanese public is willing to accept intensive questioning, and the impressive 
record and relative leniency of the country’s justice system as well as the role of 
confessions in enhancing prospects for rehabilitation of offenders makes it difficult to 
advocate a change toward the American model); Futaba Igarashi, Forced to Confess, in 
DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 195, 195-213 (Gavan McCormack ed. & trans., 
1986) (asserting that the conditions under which suspects are held, e.g. little food and 
hours of endless interrogation, pressure them to confess).  
106  See Foote, supra note 105, at 429-30 (describing the importance of long 
detention times in procuring confessions). 
107 See id. at 430 (noting that prosecutors usually request extra detention time). 
108 In 2004, detention requests were granted 99.6% of the time.  See MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2005:  JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, pt. 2, ch. 2, sec. 3 
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2005], available at 
http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/53/nfm/mokuji.html (last visited May 10, 2009). 
109 See KENPŌ, art. 38. 
110 See Foote, supra note 105, at 434-35 (explaining that in 1952, the Supreme Court 
ruled that police did not need to mention a suspect’s right to silence when providing an 
opportunity for the suspect to speak). 
111 See Saito v. Japan (The No Coerced Confession Case), 53 KEISHŪ 514 (Sup. Ct., 
Mar. 24, 1999). 
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mandatory.112   
 The Supreme Court further eroded Article 38 by upholding the 
legality of so-called “substitute prisons.” 113   The Japanese Code of 
Prisons, enacted in 1908, authorized police detention cells to be used as 
substitutes for prisons to relieve overcrowding. 114   Today, no prison 
shortage remains, but suspects are routinely held in police detention cells 
to provide investigators more opportunities to procure confessions.115 
 In addition to reflecting a greater trust in the propriety of 
investigating officials, the judiciary’s dilution of the privilege against 
self-incrimination signals the supreme importance of confessions in the 
Japanese justice system.  Police and prosecutors strive to procure 
confessions and most of the time they are successful.  Over 90% of 
suspects in Japan confess. 116   The primary role of confessions is 
evidentiary.  Police and prosecutors elicit confessions, compare the 
suspect’s statements with the material evidence, pursue more evidence 
on the basis of those statements, and finally decide how to dispose of the 
case. 
 But confessions are also essential for achieving another goal:  the 
rehabilitation of the offender.  Japanese criminal justice garners much 
praise for its distinctive commitment to rehabilitation.117  By invoking 
feelings of repentance and offering leniency in exchange for sincere 
expressions of remorse, justice officials attempt to correct certain 
 
112 See id.  
113 See Fujii v. Japan, 18 KEISHŪ 127 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 9, 1964). 
114 SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN:  A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME 9 (Frank G. 
Bennett, Jr. & John O. Haley trans., 1992). 
115  See, e.g., JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, JAPAN’S ‘SUBSTITUTE 
PRISON’ SHOCKS THE WORLD:  DAIYO KANGOKU AND THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST 
TORTURE’S RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2d. rev. ed. 2008), available at 
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/activities/statements/data/daiyo_kangoku.pdf (last 
visited May 10, 2009). 
116  Supreme Court of Japan, Statistics on Criminal Cases in Japan, tbl. 2, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/proceedings/statistics_criminal_cases_index.html (last 
visited May 10, 2009). 
117 See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989) 
61-65 (using Japan to illustrate his argument that society will have lower crime rates by 
effectively communicating shame about crime and supporting reintegration); Daniel H. 
Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317 
(1992) (explaining Japan’s model of rehabilitation and reintegration and assessing its 
successes and failures). 
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categories of offenders and reintegrate them back into society. 118  
Supported by what have been deemed widely accepted inclinations to 
apology and forgiveness, this benevolent approach to criminal justice—
summarized in the oft-cited Japanese proverb, “condemn the crime, not 
the criminal”—avoids, where possible, the stigma and social disruption 
of public trial and prison.119  In order to determine whether an offender is 
correctable, however, prosecutors need to discover the motive for his 
offense and ensure the social environment he returns to will be 
conducive to rehabilitation.  This requires the cooperation of the suspect. 
Despite the justice system’s continued reliance on confessions, over the 
last twenty-five years criminal suspects have gradually gained more 
protection.  In response to concerns about forced confessions, the 
Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office recently agreed to allow audio and 
video recording of some aspects of interrogations on a trial basis.120  
These recordings will be used for cases likely to be heard by the saiban-
in.121  In addition, new oversight committees will be placed in detention 
centers to guard against inmate maltreatment.122 
 As part of the current judicial reform movement, prosecutors must 
now disclose all the information they uncovered during their 
investigation if they plan to present it at trial, even if it was excluded 
from the official dossier.123  This change was necessary for the saiban-in 
trials.  In bench trials, hearings relied on written documents and were 
staggered over several months.  Lay participation required short trial 
periods and live testimony.  As a result, defense attorneys needed to be 
as thoroughly prepared on the first day of the trial as prosecutors.  In 
addition to these new rights, during private interviews with the author, 
 
118 Haley, supra note 32, at 133. 
119 See id. (positing that failure to obtain a confession is interpreted as the suspect 
being unrepentant or uncorrectable more often than as the prosecutor having made an 
error and the suspect being not guilty). 
120 See, e.g., Tōru Tsunetsugu & Yūsuke Yoshino, Prosecution Yields to Pressure, 
DAILY YOMIURI, May 11, 2006. 
121 See, e.g., Certain Grillings Exempt:  Prosecutors to Tape Interrogations, JAPAN 
TIMES, May 10, 2006. 
122 Keiji shūyō shisetsu oyobi hishūyōsha nado no shogū ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on 
Penal Detention Facilities and Treatment of Inmates and Detainees], Act No. 50 of 2005, 
art. 7; See, e.g., Masami Itō, Inmate Rights Bill Passed, JAPAN TIMES, June 3, 2006. 
123 Keiji soshōhō to no ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [Law to Amend the Criminal 
Procedure Code and Other Laws], Law No. 62 of 2004, art. 316, no. 14. 
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young Japanese defense lawyers exhibited a greater distrust of 
prosecutors than their older colleagues and a willingness to adopt more 
aggressive defense tactics if their clients request them.124 
 These reforms may portend an incipient adversarial ethos among the 
bar, but justice officials continue to subscribe to the inquisitorial idea that 
impartial legal professionals must excavate the truth.  They further 
regard an American-style interpretation of constitutional protections, 
particularly the right against self-incrimination, as an intolerable obstacle 
to this duty.  The same legislation that established oversight committees 
in detention centers maintained the use of substitute prisons, over the 
objections of opposition parties and human rights groups.  By the same 
token, prosecutors continue to condemn aggressive defense tactics.  In 
1995, a group of private Japanese attorneys formed the Miranda Society, 
an association dedicated to securing the right against self-incrimination 
by advising accused clients to refuse interrogation without the presence 
of counsel and to otherwise remain uncooperative unless accompanied 
by a lawyer.125  In response, some prosecutors have excoriated these 
activities and accused Miranda lawyers of forgetting their “professional 
obligation to preserve social justice.”126 
 In conclusion, the Japanese justice system operates according to 
Damaška’s model of the hierarchical ideal.  High authority presents an 
exclusive interpretation of legal codes, determines which factors should 
be assigned probative weight in determinations of guilt, and lays out 
precisely how various actions by the defendant impact sentencing.  
Justice is defined as fidelity to these standards and so decision making is 
entrusted to legal professionals well versed in complex organizational 
conventions and subject to oversight and discipline by superiors. 
 Lay juries threaten this approach to justice.  Ignorant of official 
standards and possibly unsympathetic to the goals they are designed to 
advance, lay persons are certain to bring a measure of unpredictability to 
the decision-making process and may inject into it irrationality, emotion, 
or bias.  The hostility toward lay participation displayed by the Supreme 
 
124 Interviews with defense lawyers, July, 2008. 
125  See Takashi Takano, The Miranda Experience in Japan, in THE JAPANESE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT:  CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS 128, 130 
(Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002). 
126 Id. at 133. 
2009] THE 6EW JAPA6ESE JURY SYSTEM 149 
 
Court and, to a lesser extent, the Ministry of Justice during the jury 
debates reflects their commitment to the Continental vision of justice. 
 
IV. JURY REFORM 
A. The Origins of the Jury Reform 
 
 Criticism of the criminal justice system began to build in the 1970s 
and 1980s following a series of high-profile death-row acquittals in 
which innocent defendants endured decades-long imprisonment. 127  
Judges came under fire for poor fact-finding and citizen groups calling 
for criminal juries started to emerge.128  These citizen groups saw lay 
participation as a corrective to the limited life experience of judges and 
as a necessary safeguard for the defendant’s rights. 129   In 1987, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged declining public trust in the judiciary by 
commissioning studies of foreign jury systems.130  Encouraged by this 
decision, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) held national 
symposiums on juries in the early 1990s131 and citizen groups recruited 
people each year to participate in mock trials.132 
 The origins of the saiban-in, however, cannot be directly traced to 
these civil activities.  Instead, the saiban-in grew out of a government-
driven reform movement aimed at strengthening the rule of law.  After 
the burst of the financial bubble in 1989, the government embarked on a 
major renovation of the country’s social, economic, and political arenas.  
 
127 See Daniel H. Foote, From Japan’s Death Row to Freedom, 1 PAC. RIM. L. & 
POL’Y J. 11 (1992) (discussing four cases in which innocent individuals were sentenced 
to death based on faulty findings of fact). 
128 See Baishin saiban wo kangaeru kai Homepage, http://www.baishin.com (last 
visited May 10, 2009) (examining various options for incorporating lay participation into 
the criminal justice system); Baishin seido wo fukkatsu suru kai Homepage, 
http://www.baishin.sakura.ne.jp (last visited May 10, 2009) (advocating a full jury 
system).  See also Anna Dobrovolskaia, An All-Laymen Jury System Instead of the Lay 
Assessor (Saiban-in) System for Japan?  Anglo-American-Style Jury Trials in Okinawa 
Under the U.S. Occupation, 12 J. JAPAN. L. 57, 63-64 (2007) (providing an overview of 
Japanese organizations that promote all-layperson juries). 
129 Baishin wo kangaeru kai Homepage, 6aze baishin saiban ka [Why Jury Trials?], 
http://www.baishin.com/01kiso/index.htm (last visited May 10, 2009). 
130 See Maruta, supra note 3, at 220. 
131 See id. (explaining how the JFBA considered reintroduction of jury trials in detail 
during the 13th and 14th Judicial Symposiums in 1990 and 1992, respectively). 
132 See Dobrovolskaia, supra note 118, at 63. 
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Japan’s much hailed system of administrative guidance, in which highly 
trained bureaucrats used an array of extra-legal carrots and sticks to 
persuade regulated parties to adopt administrative goals, was blamed for 
the economic crisis.133  The Administrative Procedure Act134 and new 
laws involving freedom of information135 increased the transparency of 
bureaucratic decisions and made it easier for plaintiffs to challenge 
government decisions.  Reforms to the electoral system in 1994 
expanded judicial supervision of elections.136  Corporate reforms helped 
protect shareholder rights.137  A small claims procedure was introduced 
and judges were empowered to order businesses to disclose 
documents.138  In 1998, the Civil Procedure Code was amended to speed 
up trials and make litigation more attractive.139 
 Underlying all these changes was an expanded role for the judiciary 
in managing disputes.  Thus the final “linchpin” of the country’s 
reformist drive became judicial reform and in 1999 the government 
began soliciting opinions on what it should include.140  Recognizing the 
first major opening for judicial reform in over fifty years, groups ranging 
from political parties and business associations to legal organizations and 
domestic think tanks quickly submitted their proposals.141  As the draft of 
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the law establishing a reform council moved through the Diet, the 
mandate of the proposed council underwent continuous revision. 
 The story of the saiban-in begins with the mandate for the JSRC.  
Article 2 required the council to “clarify the role of the Japanese 
judiciary in the 21st century, investigate how to make it easier for the 
public to use, examine a system of popular participation in the judiciary, 
strengthen the three branches of the legal profession and determine how 
they should perform, and explore other policies regarding reform to the 
justice system, including its foundation and operation.”142 
 The ambiguity of the mandate—not to mention the breadth of topics 
it covered—handed enormous discretion to the thirteen members of the 
council.  These members included representatives of the three branches 
of the legal profession (the bar, the judiciary, and the procuracy), law 
professors, representatives of business and labor, a civic organization, 
and an author.143 
 The members of the JSRC were charged with drafting 
recommendations for improving the justice system.  All agreed that 
criminal trials took too long to resolve and that proceedings were 
inaccessible to the public. 144   In particular, the court’s reliance on 
dossiers was said to inhibit public understanding.  Lay participation 
would necessitate shorter trials and replace the dossier-based trial 
procedure with live testimony and oral arguments, thereby opening up 
the workings of the trial to the eyes of the public.145  A consensus quickly 
arose to introduce some sort of jury system and to restrict its domain, at 
least initially, to criminal trials. 
 
B. Rationales for Lay Participation 
 
 The primary argument for lay participation advanced in the JSRC 
centered on a perceived disparity between the concerns of the judiciary 
and those of the public.  Critics alleged that justice officials were 
excessively insulated from the public and made decisions that lacked 
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common sense.146  As a result, public trust in the judiciary had declined.  
The notion that professional judges are out of touch with common social 
ideas and public morals is familiar to students of juries in Western 
countries, but the point has particular salience in Japan.  The 
backgrounds and experiences of Japanese judges are strikingly 
homogenous. 147   Many hail from the same elite high schools and 
universities.148  Upon graduation, they study a uniform curriculum at the 
same legal training institute and spend most of their careers serving as 
judges.149  Long working hours afford them little time to socialize outside 
their field.150  A judicial rotation system which sends judges to different 
regions of the country every three years further divorces them from the 
communities in which they work.151 
 JSRC members agreed that this distance from the public diminished 
the quality of the justice system, but differed on how it impacted public 
trust and why lay participation would improve the judiciary.  Broadly 
defined, two groups emerged.  One group, which included all members 
of the JSRC except those from the Court and Ministry of Justice, 
believed that this insulation had generated a host of defects that in turn 
undermined the legitimacy of the courts.  For purposes of clarity I call 
members of this group “reformers.”   Citing the high approval rate for 
warrant requests, Tsuyoshi Takagi derided judges as mere “palanquin 
bearers” for investigators.152  In trial proceedings, he claimed that judges 
displayed no human warmth toward victims and rendered decisions at 
odds with public sentiment.153  Legal professionals monopolized the legal 
system as a whole, charged Kōichiro Fujikura, and gave no role to the 
public in realizing the law.154  As a result, the public did not understand 
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what the courts were for.155  Kōzō Fujita, a former High Court judge 
turned attorney, indicted the philosophical foundation of the judiciary 
and argued that it should be based on the principle of popular 
sovereignty.156  How exactly judicial thinking differed from the public’s 
was never specified.  Nevertheless, bridging the gap between lay and 
professional thinking, however that gap was imagined, became the chief 
argument for lay participation.  Though critics were split on whether lay 
persons should supplement or replace professional judges—in other 
words, whether to introduce mixed or all-lay juries—all agreed that 
reducing the influence of judges would improve the quality of criminal 
justice. 
 The Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice acknowledged that 
bridging the gap between lay and professional opinions would improve 
the justice system, but adamantly maintained that judges should remain 
the primary adjudicators.  In defending the judiciary, the Supreme Court 
articulated a vision of the justice system that resemble Damaška’s 
hierarchical ideal.157  According to this view, Japan’s unitary system is 
marked by consistency and homogeneity, which have in turn provided 
fair and predictable decisions.  The aim of the judiciary, the Court 
argued, was to discover the truth and clarify the result to the public.158  
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Japanese criminal justice may operate under a party-led process modeled 
on the American adversarial system, but the demands of discovering 
truth were so high that judges must play the role of guardian in 
supplementing the deficiencies of the parties’ activities.159  Apart from 
problems with trial length and transparency, the Court contended, no one 
could dispute that the judiciary delivered quality justice.160 
 The Court agreed with critics that the most important challenge 
facing the judiciary was winning the trust of the public.  This had 
become more difficult, the Court contended, not because of any defect in 
the judiciary, as its critics argued, but because, as living patterns 
changed, the values of the public had diversified. 161   While this 
argument, as presented to the JSRC, was never explained in detail, it 
seems the court believed that social forces had transformed a once 
homogenous Japanese society into one of diverse values and 
perspectives.  The only way for judicial decisions to accord with this new 
diversity of opinions was to provide a representative sample of lay 
citizens a hand in deliberations.  Judicial decisions could then become 
more firmly grounded in common sense, and secure the public’s trust.162  
Again, the Supreme Court did not specify in which areas judicial 
perspectives diverged from those of the public.  Nor did it explain how 
what they perceived as a decline in public trust had affected the 
judiciary’s operation.  The Ministry of Justice left these same questions 
unanswered when its representatives offered an identical diagnosis of the 
justice system.163  In the Conclusion, I speculate on the areas in which 
the opinions of the public and the judiciary diverge, and why justice 
officials were concerned about the difference. 
 For the Supreme Court, the goal of justice system reform was to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the judiciary by injecting lay opinions into 
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deliberations while at the same time maintaining a system of justice in 
which the discovery of the truth is entrusted to professional judges.  
Achieving this balance required certain limits on the role for lay 
participants.  Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court opposed an all-lay jury 
system.  An American-style jury system would retreat from the truth 
discovering function of the courts, it claimed, because no reasons would 
be attached to jury decisions and outside observers could not guarantee 
the probity of the deliberations.  Without a written record, determining 
how jurors reconciled two pieces of contradictory evidence would be 
impossible.164  In an apparent rebuke to Fujita’s claim that juries should 
be based on popular sovereignty, the Court claimed that under such a 
system the jury’s recognition of facts would become the “voice of the 
emperor” and appeals would not be permitted.165  Seeking to reconcile 
lay participation with what was perceived as the duty of professionals to 
ascertain the truth, the Court proposed a jury system in which lay persons 
could participate in proceedings and express their opinion but were 
denied any voting power in decisions.  This proved unacceptable to the 
majority of the council and the Court quickly shifted its support to a 
mixed jury system to stave off any further erosion of judicial influence. 
 
C. The Function of the Saiban-in 
 
 The rationale for juries settled on by the council laid the groundwork 
for a jury system that accommodated the core arguments of both sides.  
For reformers, this was injecting a measure of common sense and public 
values into court decisions by giving lay persons a determining power 
over fact-finding and sentencing.  For justice officials, this amounted to 
preserving a role for professional judges in decision-making and, 
critically, providing a justification for them to educate lay jurors in the 
conventions of the judiciary and its notions of justice.  The council 
achieved this by emphasizing cooperation and exchange of knowledge.  
The final report of the JSRC states: 
The significance of the involvement of saiban-in is that, while judges 
and saiban-in share responsibilities, the judges who are legal specialists 
and the saiban-in who are laypersons will share their respective 
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knowledge and experience through mutual communication and reflect 
the results thereof in their judgments. This significance applies not only 
to fact finding and decisions on guilt, but in the same way to decisions 
on sentencing, as to which the public takes a strong interest.166 
Details from the JSRC meetings clarify this.  The purpose of a jury 
system, posited Kōichiro Fujikura, is to facilitate communication 
between the public and legal professionals, each of whom fulfills fixed 
roles.167  Lay judges are valued for their fresh perspective and knowledge 
of common social ideas.168  For example, lay persons and professionals 
will look at a nervous witness and likely evaluate that behavior very 
differently.169  Lay participation will lead to more robust deliberation, 
which in turn will yield a better quality of justice.170   Because their 
participation ensures that the decisions of the court meet public 
expectations and trust, lay persons must play a substantive role in 
decisions.171  The legal profession is obligated to behave toward the lay 
judges as legal specialists.172  Their role is to help the public understand 
the law by explaining their decision-making process.173  The goal is to 
create a system that can be appropriately called a people’s court that also 
reflects the consciousness of the legal professionals.174 
 By casting judges in the role of legal educators for the public, the 
JSRC report provided an opening for the Court to maintain what it 
believed were the essential features of the justice system.  This opening 
was seized in 2005 when researchers at the Supreme Court began work 
on drafting the details of the jury system.  Article 2 of the Supplementary 
Provisions of the Lay Assessor Act empowered the Supreme Court to 
articulate the details of the saiban-in system’s operation by clarifying 
such things as the duties of lay assessors in deliberations and the 
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significance of their participation. 175  Throughout their meetings, 
researchers consistently and unanimously affirmed that the introduction 
of lay persons should not require any departure from what it expressed in 
the JSRC as the core features of the judiciary.  All researchers agreed, for 
example, that professional judges still retained the duty to determine the 
truth and ensure consistency in decision-making. 176   For this reason, 
judges would provide lay assessors with a detailed sentencing history in 
similar cases.  Without this guidance, researchers unanimously reasoned, 
prosecutors could too easily lure jurors into adopting the sentences that 
they thought appropriate.177 
 
V. THE ENDURING MYTH OF THE IMMATURE JAPANESE PUBLIC 
 
 The notion that judges should serve as educators for lay judges was 
supported by the long-standing belief among Japanese elites that the 
average Japanese citizen lacks the political maturity to participate in 
governance.  It was this notion that was used to torpedo previous 
attempts to introduce lay participation in criminal justice.  In the 1870s, 
Gustave Boissonade, the French jurist and legal advisor to the Meiji 
oligarchs, repeatedly tried to establish a Western-style jury system, first 
in early drafts of the criminal code, and then in a preliminary version of 
the Constitution. 178   Boissonade argued that juries would convince 
Western powers that Japanese justice was modern and impartial.179  In 
both attempts, he was frustrated by officials who argued that the public 
was not ready for such responsibility.180 
 This meme reemerged in the immediate post-war period when SCAP 
officials recommended juries as part of their wide-ranging reform of 
Japanese justice.181  The Ministry of Justice resisted, citing the failure of 
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the pre-war juries and locating the cause in the public’s immaturity.182  
American reformers, eventually endorsing this view, did not press the 
point.183 
 The image of the lay Japanese as immature took on a slightly 
different guise and gained a new measure of respectability in the 1960s 
with the publication of Takeyoshi Kawashima’s book, “The Legal 
Consciousness of the Japanese.”184  Kawashima, regarded as the founder 
of sociology of law in Japan, presented a picture of the Japanese as 
excessively deferential and inclined to compromise over confrontation.  
Asking why, in comparison to the West, the Japanese eschewed 
litigation, he argued that the Japanese possess a weak legal 
consciousness and have a cultural preference for harmony. 185  
Subsequent scholarship has undermined this view and highlighted 
structural features of the justice system that discourage litigation. 186  
Nevertheless, Kawashima’s image of the Japanese persists among 
Japanese elites and informs some Western observers who question 
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 This image of the immature lay Japanese reemerged throughout the 
JSRC discussions.  In the 31st meeting, doubts arose as to whether the 
democratic consciousness of the Japanese, which had been cultivated in a 
mere fifty years of democratic government, was mature enough to 
support a full jury system.188  In an addendum to that meeting, Hiroji 
Ishii noted that even if the public accepted the burden of a jury system, 
some method must be found for cultivating the public’s moral sense 
beginning in childhood.  Otherwise, lay jurors would be easily swayed 
by emotion and misunderstand their role.189 
 In the 32nd meeting, one member compared the lay Japanese 
unfavorably with their Western counterparts.  While in the West a public 
consciousness had developed over centuries, the Japanese had been 
dependent on a governing authority.  They thus had no training in 
expressing their opinion.  As one member put it, “[t]hey cannot even 
scold their own children.”190  An early draft on the lay assessor bill 
obligating the lay persons to voice an opinion during deliberations 
reflected the fear that lay assessors would be too passive to properly 
undertake their roles.191 
 The JSRC’s final report revives the belief that average Japanese are 
not yet sufficiently independent in mind to participate unaided in public 
affairs.  “[I]t is incumbent on the people to break out of the excessive 
dependency on the state that accompanies the traditional consciousness 
of being governed objects, develop public consciousness within 
themselves, and become more actively involved in public affairs.”192 
 This assumption of political immaturity provided judges with a 
convenient opportunity to fulfill their roles as legal educators.  During 
the Supreme Court’s meetings on the saiban-in, researchers justified a 
larger role for judges by reference to relieving the burden on the public 
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and filling holes in their knowledge.193  Through their role as educators, 
judges could ensure standards they had spent years mastering. 
 
VI. THE STRUCTURE OF THE JURY SYSTEM 
 
 In this section, I review the operation of the system and then explain 
how it combines the benefits of lay participation without abandoning a 
commitment to uniform standards for fact-finding and decision making. 
 
A. The Lay Assessor Act 
 
 The law establishing and governing jury trials is the Lay Assessor 
Act.  Enacted by the Diet on May 28, 2004, the law calls for mixed 
panels of professional judges and lay jurors to determine the guilt and 
sentences of persons charged with serious crimes.194  The details of the 
jury system have yet to be confirmed by the Supreme Court,195  and 
modifications will likely occur after its scheduled evaluation in 2012.196  
Nevertheless, a broad outline of the jury system is visible. 
 Three judges and six lay assessors will hear contested cases; one 
judge and four lay assessors, uncontested ones.197  Judges and jurors are 
responsible for finding facts, applying laws, and determining 
sentences.198  Judges retain the exclusive privilege to interpret law and 
determine procedure.199  Decisions are reached through a majority vote 
and require that at least one judge and one lay juror assent.200  In the 
event this requirement cannot be met in sentencing decisions, the number 
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of opinions for the harshest sentence will be added to the number of 
opinions for the next harshest sentence until a majority is reached that 
includes both a judge and juror. 201   Who decides which sentence is 
harshest and how the votes are counted is yet to be determined.  Unlike 
the German mixed jury system, jurors sit for only one case.202  Both 
judges and lay jurors can question witnesses, the defendant, and the 
victim.203 
 Jurors will be drawn randomly from the electoral roles within 
municipal jurisdictions.204  This fixes the minimum age for jury service at 
twenty years old.205  Those who have failed to complete compulsory 
education (up to junior high school) cannot serve.206  Politicians and 
members of the legal profession are also excluded. 207   Lay juror 
candidates will be screened on the basis of information they provide on a 
questionnaire and in a selection proceeding,208 and will be subject to 
limited voir dire vetting by the prosecution and defense.209 
 Juries will hear only a fraction of the criminal cases processed in 
Japan. In 2004, public prosecutors disposed of 2,183,811 cases.210  34.5% 
were sent to summary courts, where punishment is limited to minor fines 
and short-term imprisonment.211  10.9% were referred to family courts.212  
44.7% received suspensions of prosecutions and 2.9% were not 
prosecuted for a variety of reasons. 213   In only 6.8% of cases were 
suspects (148,939) indicted.214  Of those indicted, only 2.2%, or 3,308 
cases, would have received jury trials.215  The bulk of criminal cases will 
remain the exclusive province of legal professionals.  This is similar to 
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the U.S., where juries hear only about 2% of felony dispositions.216 
 The introduction of lay participants demands faster trials and more 
accessible court proceedings, and officials have responded with changes 
to the pre-trial and trial procedures.  Previously, trials for serious crimes 
extended over many months.  In 2005, trial courts averaged 2.4 hearings 
over a 2.8 month period when defendants confessed.217  In contested 
cases, 7.3 hearings on average were held over a 9.5 month period.218  To 
speed up proceedings and accommodate lay jurors, a new pre-trial was 
introduced in 2005.219  The prosecution and defense now consult with the 
presiding judge before the trial to identify the disputed points for the jury 
to decide.  The focus of trials will also shift from written material to oral 
argument and live testimony.  Currently, prosecutors collect evidence, 
interview witnesses, procure confessions, note evidence of offender 
remorse (if any) and compile their findings in a massive dossier that 
forms the basis for a judge’s verdict and sentencing.220  To ensure that 
proceedings are accessible to lay jurors, saiban-in trials will differ in 
several respects.  In place of dossiers, the prosecution and defense will 
present their evidence orally.  Witnesses and the accused will be cross-
examined in public.  Prosecutors and defense lawyers have begun honing 
their public speaking skills and courtrooms have been outfitted with 
screens and other devices to make the presentation of evidence more 
accessible to the lay judges.221  Still, prosecutors will create a dossier (for 
 
216 See G. Thomas Munsterman & Shauna Strickland, Jury 6ews, 19 CT. MANAGER 
50, 51 (2004) (noting that by 2002, the trial rate for felonies had fallen to 22 trials for 
every 1,000 dispositions). 
217 See Wilson, supra note 6, at 845 (citing SUP. CT., SAIBAN-IN SEIDO NO TAISHŌ TO 
NARU JIKEN NO JINNINSUU, GENZAI NO HEIKIN KANRI KIKAN OYOBI HEIKIN KAITEI KAISUU-
HEISEI 17NEN [NUMBER OF NECESSARY LAY JUDGES, AVERAGE NUMBER OF 
INVESTIGATIONS, AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF TRIALS IN 2005]). 
218 Id. 
219 Keiji soshōhō to no ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [Law to Amend the Criminal 
Procedure Code and Other Laws], Law No. 62 of 2004. 
220 See JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 36, 52. 
221  See, e.g., Posting of Robert E. Precht to Foley Square:  Thoughts on Legal 
Reform in China and Japan, Article on Trial Techniques for Japanese Lawyers, 
http://www.foleysquare.com/my_weblog/2008/03/article-on-tria.html (Mar. 11, 2008) 
(last visited May 10, 2009); Posting of Robert E. Precht to Foley Square:  Thoughts on 
Legal Reform in China and Japan, Bengoshi Create Opening Statements, 
http://www.foleysquare.com/my_weblog/2007/12/bengoshi-work-o.html (Dec. 24, 2007) 
(last visited May 10, 2009) (depicting lawyers working on opening statements). 
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determining the indictment) and some have discussed providing jurors 
with shortened versions of it.222 
 At the close of the trial, the panel of judges and lay jurors will retire 
to deliberate.  The Lay Assessor Act provides little guidance for how 
deliberation should proceed.  This question was left to researchers at the 
Supreme Court.  Though every detail is not finalized, summaries of their 
meetings indicate that some important decisions have already been 
made. 223   Researchers determined that jury deliberations should open 
with undirected, free conversation about the trial and evidence, after 
which judges can clarify disputed points, review the evidence, and 
explain the law.224  Great emphasis was placed on guarding against the 
possibility of judges leading lay jurors to the judges’ interpretation of 
events.225  For example, judges will be asked to state their opinion only 
after the lay jurors have stated theirs.226  In the case of a disagreement 
between a judge and the lay jurors, if the judge can recognize the lay 
interpretation as valid, she should defer to the jurors.227  Judges should 
state only their opinion and avoid actively persuading jurors, especially 
at the beginning stages of the deliberation.228  However, if a judge cannot 
compromise on a disputed point, she is permitted to vigorously argue her 
view. 229   Judges have begun practicing in mock trials, 230  though it 
remains to be seen how they will behave in real trials.  There is some 
indication that the Court is extremely sensitive to the perception of 
judicial domination.  During an interview with the author, one Kansai 
judge recalled being scolded by his superiors for attempting to persuade 
 
222 Interview with Kansai judge, July, 2008. 
223 For a detailed account of these meetings, see Imasaki, supra note 193; Yukihiko 
Imasaki, Saiban-in saiban ni okeru fukuzatsu konnan jiken no shinri [The Adjudication of 
Complex Issues in Lay-Assessor Trials], HANREI TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006 [hereinafter 
Imasaki, Adjudication of Complex Issues]; Imasaki, supra note 176. 
224 Imasaki, supra note 176, at 6-7. 
225 See generally id.; Imasaki, Adjudication of Complex Issues, supra note 223, at 
13. 
226 Imasaki, supra note 176, at 6. 
227 Imasaki, Adjudication of Complex Issues, supra note 223, at 13. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Japan Learns the Dreaded Task of Jury Duty, N.Y 
TIMES (July 16, 2007) (discussing the overall experience of mock trials in Japan). 
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a lay juror.231 
 When a defendant was found guilty, researchers at the Supreme 
Court were unanimous in deciding to present jurors with a list of 
sentences given to defendants in similar cases in the past.232  The author 
was able to obtain a sample of this document used in a mock trial on the 
condition that it not be published.233 
 The top of the sample features a summary of the facts of the crime.  
In this case, it was a street robbery resulting in injury, committed by a 
single assailant without a weapon.  Past offenses and the victim’s 
recovery time are also included.  Following this is a range of past 
sentences given to eleven similar offenses, displayed as a chart and 
graph.  A brief description of each case is provided, along with 
information on the defendant’s criminal record, whether compensation or 
an apology was offered to the victim, and the victim’s attitude toward the 
defendant.  Jurors are not required to conform their decisions to past 
standards, however, and may decide any sentence within the law. 
At the close of the deliberations, one of the presiding judges will 
compose a detailed document listing which facts were found to be true, 
how the law was applied, and what factors led to the sentence.234  In line 
with common practice in civil law countries, both acquittals and 
convictions can be appealed. 
 
B. Empowering Lay Persons, Maintaining Professional Standards 
 
 How does the saiban-in system balance the power of elite and lay 
participants?  Looking over the Lay Assessor Act and the details 
elaborated by the Supreme Court, the saiban-in system affords lay judges 
substantial discretion to find facts, form and articulate their assessment 
of the evidence, and determine the final outcome of a case.  This power 
is supported formally by the equality of lay and professional jurors stated 
 
231 Interview with Kansai Judge, July, 2008. 
232 Imasaki, supra note 176, at 7. 
233 Presumably, judges fear criminals will exploit their knowledge of the details of 
the court’s punishment standards.  This perhaps may partly explain the regulation barring 
lay judges from publicly discussing their jury experience even after the trial ends.  Lay 
Assessor Act, arts. 9(2), 70, 79. 
234 Imasaki, supra note 176, at 12−13. 
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in the Lay Assessor Act,235  and substantively in the structure of the 
saiban-in and the guidelines on judicial behavior.236 
 Compared to their counterparts in the United States and United 
Kingdom, Japanese lay assessors have much more authority to uncover 
facts that they believe are relevant to decision-making through their right 
to question witnesses, the defendant, and the victim.  Furthermore, unlike 
jurors in the American system, they possess a measure of direct control 
over sentencing. 
 The composition of the saiban-in and rules on decision-making also 
afford Japanese lay judges more influence than their equivalents in the 
German mixed jury system, upon which the saiban-in was partly based.  
In Germany, mixed panels hearing serious crimes are composed of two 
lay judges and two to three professionals.237  Decisions that disadvantage 
the accused require a two-thirds majority vote.238  In Japan, lay assessors 
outnumber judges by at least two to one in both types of panels and 
require the consent of only one judge in order to reach a decision.239  
Guidelines on deliberation also give more power to lay judges than their 
counterparts in Germany. While the Japanese Supreme Court has 
emphasized cooperation and equality between judges and lay jurors,240 
the German Code of Criminal Procedure empowers judges to lead debate 
by putting questions to jurors.241  Furthermore, unlike lay participants in 
saiban-in trials, German lay jurors may not view the dossier that forms 
 
235 Lay Assessor Act art. 62. 
236 References to “guidelines on judicial behavior” indicate decisions on saiban-in 
procedures that came out of Supreme Court discussions.  See, e.g., Imasaki, supra notes 
176, 193; Imasaki, Adjudication of Complex Issues, supra note 223 (summarizing the 
Supreme Court meetings). 
237 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG] [Court Organizational Statute] May 9, 1975, 
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 1077, as amended, § 74, ¶ 1, § 76 ¶ 2, sentence 2 
(F.R.G.).  See also Thomas Weigend, Germany, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  A 
WORLDWIDE STUDY 243, 263 n.118 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed., 2007) (noting that if 
the victim of a serious crime survives the attack, the court can sit with two instead of 
three professional judges).  
238 Id. at 263-64. 
239 Lay Assessor Act art. 2. 
240 Imasaki, supra note 176. 
241 See John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court:  Could the Continental 
Alternative Fill the American 6eed?, 6 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 200 (1981) (indicating 
that the presiding judge leads the “in camera” proceedings and “puts the questions and 
takes the votes” pursuant to the statute). 
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the basis of the judges’ interrogation and thus they rarely pose questions 
at trial.242  The Japanese may have a reputation for passivity, but it was 
the meekness of the German lay juror that was criticized in the JSRC 
deliberations.243 
 Lay participation is further enhanced by the presence of rules that 
appear to implicitly acknowledge the flaws that undermined the efficacy 
of the country’s first jury system.  When cases are eligible for saiban-in 
trials, juries are mandatory.  Defendants cannot opt for all-judge panels 
as they could in the past.  The requirement that all decisions win the 
consent of at least one judge and one juror means that judges cannot 
disregard the opinions of lay assessors, a common practice under the first 
system.  The composition of saiban-in juries will also be more 
representative than those in imperial Japan.  Previously, juries were 
composed entirely of men over thirty. 244   Today, candidates will be 
drawn from the electoral roles, giving women and the young 
opportunities to serve.  This will, however, exclude large numbers of 
ethnic Koreans and Chinese who reside in Japan as permanent residents, 
but are denied suffrage rights.245   An extensive blacklist of types of 
persons ineligible to become lay assessors—including legal professionals 
and government officials—will also prevent the sort of elite capture that 
has occurred in the German system and in Japan’s selection of summary 
court judges.246 
 Skeptics might counter that despite these rules, other provisions 
provide backdoor means for judicial domination.  For example, the Lay 
Assessor Act imposes on lay judges, but not professionals, a lifetime 
prohibition against disclosing the content of jury deliberations or any 
secrets revealed during the trial, at penalty of a fine or short-term 
 
242 See Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk:  From 
Romantic Idealism to 6azi Ideology, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 240 (1995) (noting that 
reducing the number of lay participants in German jury trials would have little effect 
since they pose few questions and therefore do not affect trial length). 
243  JSRC 32d Meeting Minutes (Sept. 26, 2000), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai32/32gaiyou.html (last visited May 10, 2009). 
244 Maruta, supra note 3, at 216. 
245 Masami Itō, Lay Judgement in Practice:  Workings of a Watershed, JAPAN TIMES, 
Feb. 27, 2005 (noting that under the law Japanese nationals of Korean origin will be 
excluded from serving). 
246 Lay Assessor Act arts. 14-15. 
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imprisonment.247  The ostensible purpose is to protect the privacy of 
jurors and trial participants.  Some speculate that this provision might 
also serve to discourage lay assessors from identifying judges who 
pressure them into adopting the “correct” view.248 
 The justice system’s reliance on confessions may open another door 
to excessive judicial influence.  As mentioned before, most Japanese 
defendants confess.  In 2007, 91.2% of defendants in district courts 
confessed.249  This means that the vast majority of saiban-in trials will be 
uncontested cases, decided by four lay assessors and one judge.  The 
stipulation that all decisions require the consent of at least one judge and 
one lay juror means that in uncontested trials the sole professional judge 
can effectively veto any decision on her own. 
 Given the woeful history of lay participation in Japan, any possibility 
of elite domination cannot be dismissed out of hand.  However, unlike 
previous attempts at democratization, the judiciary has expressed its 
support, albeit belatedly, for the saiban-in, and guidelines on judicial 
behavior confirm their commitment to ensuring lay judges have a 
substantive impact on important decisions.  Individuals in the Ministry of 
Justice, Supreme Court, and JFBA claim that in serious cases where the 
defendant confesses, the courts will exercise discretion to channel the 
case to the larger panel in order to realize the democratic ideals of the 
system.250 
 Researchers in the Supreme Court were highly sensitive to both the 
appearance and reality of judicial domination, and sought to devise rules 
for deliberation that would strengthen the impact of lay participation.  
Recall, for example, that judges are largely silenced at the beginning of 
deliberations to allow lay jurors the opportunity to form and articulate 
their opinions.  In the case of two equally valid interpretations of the 
 
247 Id. arts. 9(2), 79 (stipulating that lay assessors convicted of disclosing secrets 
could be fined up to ¥500,000 and/or imprisoned for up to six months). 
248 See Jones, supra note 6, at 370 (“While the confidentiality provisions may reflect 
a desire to protect the rights of other lay judges, they also seem designed to prevent the 
system from generating additional criticism of judiciary.”). 
249 Sup. Ct., Statistics on Criminal Cases in Japan, supra note 116. 
250  See Kent Anderson & Leah Ambler, The Slow Birth of Japan’s Quasi-Jury 
System (Saiban-in Seido):  Interim Report on the Road to Commencement, 11 J. JAPAN L. 
55, 67 (2006) (citing conversations with individuals who believe that even if parties agree 
to a smaller panel, courts will exercise discretion by referring serious matters to full 
panels instead of an abbreviated procedure). 
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facts, judges are asked to defer to the lay version.  Moreover, in mock 
trials, officials in the judiciary have criticized judges deemed excessively 
disputatious.251 
 In short, professional judges have neither the formal power nor, at 
the moment at least, the inclination to direct jurors to particular 
conclusions.  When it comes to finding facts and determining verdicts 
and sentences, lay assessors share the burden with judges as, at a 
minimum, co-equals.  Considering their numerical superiority in saiban-
in panels and the deference judges are obliged to show them during 
deliberation, one might say that in this capacity lay judges occupy a 
senior position relative to judges. 
 What part then do judges play?  Judges appear to have two 
responsibilities under the saiban-in.  As mentioned above, judges have 
the duty to find facts and determine verdicts and sentences.  In this role, 
they are equal or subordinate to their lay partners.  Where judges possess 
far more influence is in their role as legal advisers.  Judges have 
exclusive power to determine the applicable law and procedure.252  Given 
the public’s unfamiliarity with legal terms and ideas, judges are also 
expected to clearly explain the law to lay jurors so they can participate in 
decision-making.  This is particularly important because Japanese legal 
doctrines are extremely complicated.  For example, Japanese law 
contains over ten different variations on the concept of “self-defense,” 
each with a different implication for sentencing.253  Professional judges 
will explain these definitions along with the precise meaning of terms 
like “satsui” (murderous intent) and “sekinin nōryoku” (criminal 
culpability).254  Introducing these legal terms is a crucial step in teaching 
laypersons how to evaluate cases according to court-determined 
standards.  Merely knowing these definitions invariably influences the 
evidence on which one focuses.  Consider the term “reckless driving.”  
An official definition might turn on a certain number of kilometers above 
the speed limit, and a professional judge schooled in that definition will 
immediately look for evidence of that driving speed.  But someone 
 
251 Interview with Kansai judge, July, 2008. 
252  Lay Assessor Act art. 6(2). 
253 My gratitude to Professor Kanako Takayama, Kyoto University Faculty of Law, 
for pointing this out. 
254 Imasaki, supra note 193, at 15-16.  
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unfamiliar with that definition could impute any number of meanings to 
the term.  A speed excessive to one person may be normal to another.  
What is reckless on one road may be safe on another.  The experience of 
the driver, the weather and amount of daylight, the number of cars on the 
road, and myriad other factors all could reasonably be considered in any 
definition of “reckless.”  How one defines it will determine what facts 
one looks for. Thus, some lay jurors may look for the time of day and 
others the conditions of the road.  Language shapes how we see the 
world.  By teaching official legal terms to lay jurors, judges present the 
judiciary’s vision of justice. 
 A similar situation occurs in sentencing.  Lay assessors are free to 
argue for any sentence within the law.  However, judges shape the way 
lay jurors consider desert and punishment by providing them with a list 
of sentences given to defendants in the past.  This feature of the saiban-
in merits consideration because public criticism of judges has focused on 
what is perceived to be their excessive leniency.255 
 
C. Implications of the Saiban-in for Reintegrative Justice 
 
 Japanese criminal justice has garnered much praise for its 
commitment to rehabilitating offenders. 256   By invoking feelings of 
repentance in offenders and offering leniency in exchange for sincere 
expressions of remorse, justice officials attempt to correct offenders and 
reintegrate them back into society.257  While incarceration rates in the 
United States began to skyrocket in the mid-1970s,258 rates in Japan have 
remained relatively low. Today, for every person Japan imprisons, 
America incarcerates twenty-five.259  This is despite the fact that one 
study shows that Japanese citizens are no less likely than Americans to 
 
255 JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 66−72.  See generally Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics 
of Increasing Punitiveness and the Rising Populism in Japanese Criminal Justice Policy, 
10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 47 (2008) (examining recent newspaper articles to argue that 
discussions regarding criminal justice policy have been focusing on increasing 
punitiveness). 
256  See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 117; Foote, supra note 117. 
257 See Haley, supra note 32, at 133.  
258 RICK RUDDELL, AMERICA BEHIND BARS:  TRENDS IN IMPRISONMENT, 1950-2000, 
at 1-2 (2004).  
259 David T. Johnson, Criminal Justice in Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN:  A TURNING 
POINT 343, 343 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007).   
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use retributive rationales for punishing serious crimes.260  A prosperous 
economy, the wide perception and reality of public safety, and the 
insulation of prosecutors, judges, and criminal policy-makers from public 
pressure allowed Japanese officials to ignore this punitive sentiment and 
pursue correction.  Recently, those conditions have begun to erode.261  
From 1998 to 2005, the percentage of Japanese who believed that violent 
crime was increasing more than doubled.262  Although victimization rates 
for violent crime actually fell, changes to crime reporting created the 
appearance of a dramatic rise, which undermined confidence in public 
safety.263  Sensationalist media coverage of brutal crimes combined with 
the rise of a powerful victim’s rights movement inflamed public 
anxiety264 and the Diet responded by increasing penalties and creating 
new categories of offenses.265 
 Though this new punitivism is visible in both written law and 
judicial decisions, career judges and the public diverge greatly in their 
attitudes toward mitigating and aggravating factors.  In 2006, the 
Supreme Court’s Research Institute published a study comparing lay and 
judicial sentencing opinions for a broad range of variables, including the 
profile of the offender, type and method of crime, and the response of the 
aggrieved party.266  As a brief example of the reported disparity, 90.7% 
of judges believed that offenders under twenty should be afforded some 
 
260  See generally V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE:  
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 169−70 (1994) 
(comparing responses from residents of Detroit and Yokohama to the question as to 
whether anything “should be done to the driver” in an auto accident, and concluding that 
the response of “payment of medical expenses” from Detroit residents could be 
considered “restitutive”). 
261 Johnson, supra note 259, at 358−59.  
262 Koichi Hamai & Thomas Ellis, Japanese Criminal Justice:  Was Reintegrative 
Shaming a Chimera?, 10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 25, 25 (2008). 
263 See generally Koichi Hamai & Thomas Ellis, Crime and Criminal Justice in 
Modern Japan:  From Re-Integrative Shaming to Popular Punitivism, 34 INT’L  J. SOC. L. 
157 (2006) (arguing that changes in crime reporting brought on by reactionary policy-
makers have created the illusion of an increase in crime). 
264 Id. at 162, 171. 
265  See Miyazawa, supra note 255, 63−69 (tracking political pressure on Diet 
members by victims’ rights groups). 
266 SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, LEGAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE, RYŌKEI 
NI KAN SURU KOKUMIN TO SAIBANKAN NO ISHIKI NI TSUITE NO KENKYŪ [RESEARCH ON 
CITIZEN AND JUDGE AWARENESS OF SENTENCING] 6-8 (2006). 
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leniency, while none believed they deserved harsher punishment. 267  
Only 24.7% of lay respondents favored leniency, while 25.4% sought 
more severity.268  In the case of a victim’s family forgiving an offender, 
94.6% of judges supported leniency, while only 41.6% of lay 
respondents would do the same.269 
 The author’s interviews with judges indicated a desire on the part of 
the career judiciary to curb public punitiveness.  In response to an open 
question on why public trust in the judiciary had declined, the most 
common response was sentencing.  “The media focuses on sensationalist 
crimes and consistently paints a negative picture of the accused.  When 
we hand down sentences that account for the totality of evidence, 
including mitigating factors, the public becomes outraged because they 
haven’t seen the evidence that we have seen.”270 
 In the same way that professional judges guarantee that lay jurors 
approach fact-finding in what the judiciary perceives is a rational, 
rigorous, and balanced manner, past sentencing decisions serve to 
inculcate jurors in the professional judiciary’s understanding of desert 
and fairness.  If this proves persuasive to laypersons, the saiban-in might 
become the countervailing force to popular punitiveness, which will 
allow Japanese justice officials to continue to promote policies 




 Recall that the Supreme Court sought to accomplish three goals in 
the jury reform:  increase public trust in the judiciary, inject judicial 
decisions with the considerations of the public, and ensure consistency, 
predictability, and what judges perceived as fairness in decisions by 
evaluating cases according to the conventions of the court.  The inclusion 
and empowerment of professional judges in the mixed juries was not 
designed to replace lay thinking with institutional thinking.  Rather, 
judges serve to bolster public trust in the judiciary by explaining to lay 
jurors their logic and methodology and guarantee that, at a minimum, 
 
267 Id. at 15. 
268 Id.  
269 Id. at 36. 
270 Interview with Kansai judge, July, 2008. 
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jurors consider the factors believed by the court to be important for 
making just decisions.  Unlike in bench trials, the standards of the court 
are presented as merely one method of decision-making, not the only 
one.  They are open to contest and modification by lay jurors who, at the 
beginning of deliberation, form their own evaluation of the evidence and 
can freely persuade others of that evaluation’s superiority.  The 
requirement that judges must persuade at least two laypersons ensures 
that the Court’s approach to fact-finding and sentencing receives public 
scrutiny and affirmation in every case and that when Court standards 
would result in decisions that deviate from public notions of justice, lay 
jurors possess the leverage to modify them.  By the same token, 
documentation of saiban-in reasoning, superior review, and the 
requirement that at least one professional judge assent to decisions 
functions to exclude irrational or sloppy thinking and preserve a measure 
of uniformity and predictability in decisions.  In this way, the saiban-in 
system seeks to glean some of the benefits of lay participation—
strengthened public trust in the judiciary, a decision-making process 
more attuned to the complexities of life—without resigning the justice 
system to the presumed inconsistency or bias of lay opinion or 
abandoning notions of desert and punishment valued by an educated 
elite.  This is the purpose of the saiban-in. 
 Recognizing that the saiban-in is simultaneously an advance for 
democracy and an affirmation of the country’s civil law origins is crucial 
for those hoping to further expand the role of laypersons in the justice 
system.  Future proposals for expanded lay participation that do not 
permit justice officials to ensure that the decision-making process 
complies, at a minimal level, with the Supreme Court’s notion of fairness 
will be met with vigorous opposition from the judiciary and procuracy 
and will likely fail. 
 The saiban-in attempts an ambitious balance between the benefits of 
lay and elite influence on judicial decisions.  There are at least two 
potential developments which could disturb this balance.  The first is the 
judicial domination that worries so many today.  Judges may be willing 
to defer to their lay colleagues in mock trials, but it remains to be seen 
how they will behave when a decision will determine a defendant’s life.  
Alternatively, the mixed jury system will fail if the public is unwilling to 
participate.  A government survey shows that over 70% of Japanese do 
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not want to serve.271  Judges may read this apathy as tacit trust in the 
propriety of legal professionals and gradually come to dominate 
discussions in the mixed juries if lay jurors display little interest in 
contributing. 
 On the other hand, the intended balance could be upset from the 
other side.  If support for the Continental tradition diminishes, an 
American-style all-lay jury could replace the mixed jury system.  One 
can already speculate how such erosion might occur.  Saiban-in trials 
will center on live testimony and cross-examination.  In this respect, the 
JSRC has realized a core dimension of the adversarial system that 
Occupation reformers unsuccessfully labored to introduce.  These 
adversarial trials could replace the dossier-driven proceedings that are 
still used for the vast majority of criminal cases.  As mentioned 
previously, some Japanese defense attorneys have begun discouraging 
their clients from cooperating with investigators, and in the process 
irritating prosecutors, who continue to see the discovery of the truth as 
among their primary duties.  If prosecutors cannot perform this function, 
they may begin to construe their role more along the lines of an 
adversarial system. 
 The new professional law schools might also frustrate efforts by the 
judiciary and procuracy to discipline new members to conform to 
institutional conventions.  Until recently, there was no academic legal 
education specifically designed for the training of future lawyers. 272  
Most students who study law at the undergraduate level do not seek to 
become lawyers273 and the Supreme Court’s LTRI offers only practical 
legal training.  Filling this gap are over sixty new law schools, which 
began operation in 2004. 274   After completing their undergraduate 
education, aspiring lawyers will attend these schools for two to three 
 
271 Saiban-in seido ni kan suru yoron chōsa [Public Opinion Poll Regarding the Lay 
Assessor System], Dep’t of the Minister for the Cabinet Office, pt. 2, ques. 5, Feb. 2005, 
available at http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h16/h16-saiban/2-5.html (last visited May 10, 
2009). 
272 See Miyazawa, supra note 141, at 111.  
273 See Daniel H. Foote, Forces Driving and Shaping Legal Training Reform in 
Japan, 7 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 215, 216 (2005) (suggesting that the difficulty of the bar 
exam explains why most students who study law enter companies on graduation instead 
of entering the legal profession). 
274 Id. 
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years before entering the LTRI. 275   Unlike the LTRI, which gives 
students a uniform education, each of these law schools will offer their 
own gloss on legal curriculum.276  When graduates reach the LTRI, they 
will possess an understanding of the justice system and the role of legal 
professionals that might differ considerably from the one favored by the 
Supreme Court.  Additionally, their knowledge of the law will broaden 
beyond the narrow confines of the LTRI exam to include a more 
reflective and critical approach to their profession.277  As a result, young 
judges may be less willing to follow the precedents and interpretations of 
their superiors. 
 This is more likely now that decisions on judicial appointments, 
reappointments, and promotions are reviewed by legal professionals 
outside the judiciary.  In 2003, the Supreme Court responded to charges 
that their personnel decisions were opaque by creating the Lower Court 
Judge Designation Consultation Commission.278  The Commission is 
composed of eleven members, five from the legal profession and six 
“persons of learning and experience” from outside the profession. 279  
Together they review candidates for lower-court judgeships and report 
their results to the Supreme Court.280  The Commission was designed to 
increase the transparency of the judiciary and allow the views of the 
public to be reflected in personnel decisions. 281   Previously, these 
decisions were a complete black box.282  The Commission now sheds 
only a sliver of light inside283 and for the time being cannot prevent the 
Supreme Court from using its personnel office to encourage career 
judges to conform to institutional norms.  The Commission cannot 
evaluate whether the Court improperly excluded potential candidates 
 
275 See id. at 224 (noting that students who studied law at the undergraduate level 
can graduate in two years).  
276  Many have expressed concern, however, that some law schools, generally 
associated with less prestigious universities, will gear their curriculum to the LTRI exam 
to achieve high passages rates.  Id. at 235. 
277 See Miyazawa, supra note 141, at 112. 
278 Daniel H. Foote, Recent Reforms to the Japanese Judiciary, 66 HOUSHAKAIGAKU 
128, 143 (2007).  
279 Id. at 143. 
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from lists of potential appointees284 and members of the body are chosen 
by the Supreme Court.285  Nevertheless, the Commission might one day 
evolve into an institution that disrupts the ability of the Court to enforce 
uniformity in the judiciary. 
 Finally, new efforts to diversify the judiciary could obstruct the 
inquisitorial activities of prosecutors.  The Japanese bar has long 
advocated appointing practicing lawyers to the judiciary (housou 
ichigen).  Until the 1980s, these appointments were rare despite Article 
42 of the Courts Act, which permitted them.286  The JSRC intended to 
promote the practice. 287   Before the JSRC issued its final 
recommendation, the Supreme Court entered into an agreement with the 
JFBA to cooperate in promoting the appointment of lawyers.288  The 
Court also instituted a part-time judge system in which attorneys could 
serve as judges for one day per week.289 
 The consequences of these changes for the justice system are 
unclear.  On the one hand, lawyers-turned-judges might challenge the 
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the Constitution’s procedural 
protections, inhibiting inquisitorial pursuits of the truth and encouraging 
a more “American” reading of suspects’ rights.  On the other hand, as 
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys become accustomed to living 
in each other’s shoes, they might develop a consensus on the nature of 
the Japanese criminal justice, and that consensus may very well develop 
around a Continental understanding.  For the moment, this speculation is 
academic.  Few practicing attorneys have chosen to serve as judges.290 
 No doubt many who fear judicial domination in the mixed juries 
would welcome a turn to adversarial justice and an all-lay criminal jury.  
Yet the post-war successes of the Japanese criminal justice system are 
considerable enough to render any enthusiasm about such a 
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285 Id. at 143. 
286 Id. at 134-35. 
287 See id. (emphasizing that JSRC support was to reinvigorate an existing system 
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288 See id. at 135 (noting that the JFBA had long-supported the appointment of 
practicing attorneys as judges). 
289 See id. (describing that part-time judges would handle conciliatory matters at 
district, summary, and family courts). 
290 Id. at 135−36. 
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transformation premature.  Japanese officials preside over a system that 
manages to deliver justice that is simultaneously individualized and 
consistent (like cases are treated alike).291  The country’s crime rates are 
reliably among the lowest in the industrialized world, while its prisons 
hold comparatively few offenders.  
 These successes have not come without cost.  Investigations are 
invasive.  In their pursuit of the truth, police and prosecutors frequently 
encroach upon the privacy and autonomy of suspects.  Lengthy 
detentions undermine the voluntariness of confessions and zealous 
interrogations can too easily turn coercive.  Decision-making, 
particularly by the procuracy, is opaque.  Finally, justice officials can be 
unresponsive to the demands and shifting values of the public they are 
supposed to represent. 
 The saiban-in is an innovative experiment to readjust and improve 
this calculus, accommodating the diverse perspectives of the public while 
maintaining consistent decisions and elite notions of justice.  If it 
succeeds, the saiban-in will become a valuable model for countries 
seeking to temper the inequality, punitiveness, and cynicism so often 
generated by democratized justice without extinguishing what, in the 
Anglo-American tradition, is often regarded as the “lamp that shows that 
freedom lives.”292 
 
291 JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 28.  
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